Glenn Reynolds' suggestion for the continued fight against Islamic Jihadism supported by factions in Iran and Saudi Arabia:

Why aren't we waging unconventional warfare against them? They undoubtedly have toes we can step on in the form of business interests, overseas accounts, vacation homes, etc. Would we make more progress by targeting those sorts of things, rather than fighting their cannon fodder in the field? If I recall correctly, a shift to that strategy was what ended the Philippine insurgency a century ago.

But I'm no military expert, so there may be good reasons why we're not doing this. Or we may, in fact, be doing it and it just may be under the radar, though I kind of doubt that.

This may not be what he means, but this is what we've done, according to Richard Clarke's submitted testimony to the 9/11 Commission:

The Clinton Administration responded to Iraqi terrorism against the US in 1993 with a military retaliation and against Iranian terrorism against the US in 1996 at Khobar Towers with a covert action. Both US responses were accompanied by warning that further anti-US terrorism would result in greater retaliation. Neither Iraq nor Iran engaged in anti-US terrorism subsequently. (Iraqis did, of course, later engage in anti-US terrorism in 2003-4.)

No one has ever reported what that "covert action" was. But Louis Freeh was unimpressed.